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De Morgan's respect for the vagaries of mathematical history stands in marked contrast to the tendencies often exhibited in modern mathematicians' treatments of their history. These are often characterized by constructions of clear connections that show the past as a logical stage on the road to the present. Accordingly, past records are combed for glimmerings of future discoveries, and ideas obscure in their nativity are polished for modern comprehension. The unclear conceptions, peculiar interpretations, and strange motivations that might be found in an old mathematical document are ignored in favor of, or at least subordinated to, the logical structures that can be distilled from the argument. This is recognizably the historical approach against which De Morgan directed his address in 1865.
The difference in attitude between a mathematical history constructed as a logically ordered development and De Morgan's more protean approach is not just an issue of historiography or of personal taste. The difference reflects a disagreement about the nature of mathematics itself. De Morgan resisted logical reconstructions of mathematical history because he did not believe that mathematics was essentially logical. He carefully differentiated the conceptual subject matter of mathematics from the formal expression of its results. The history of mathematics traced the essentially indefinable organic process of conceptual growth, rather than the clearly definable process of formal development. For De Morgan the historical evolution of mathematical ideas provided important insights into the essential nature of the mathematics, which could not be counted on to fit neatly into logical or formal frameworks.
The difference between a formal view of mathematics and De Morgan's conceptual one is difficult to describe or demonstrate precisely. This is true even though De Morgan was passionately concerned with mathematical rigor and wrote explicitly and extensively about mathematical foundations. The difficulty lies in interpreting and understanding what he said. This problem arises largely because the difference between the conceptual and logical views of mathematical foundations is often masked for modern readers by apparently familiar words and phrases whose meanings and implications have changed slightly. Words like logical, rigorous, and exact are precisely those in which subtle differences in meaning can have powerful repercussions on interpretation. While at Cambridge De Morgan had studied under a variety of tutors and teachers, notably George Biddle Airy, George Peacock, and William Whewell. These men were holdovers from the Analytical Society, and they played a part in the introduction of Continental mathematics into the Cambridge curriculum in the decade before De Morgan matriculated.5 This was not the end of their impact, however. Long after the Analytical Society had dissolved, its members pursued careers self-consciously centering on the promotion and development of science in Britain. Airy became the Astronomer Royal. Peacock worked actively in mathematics through the 1830s. Whewell pursued an eclectic career as mathematician, philosopher, educator, and historian. Along with other Analytical Society members, like John Herschel and Charles Babbage, they were active in attempts to change the complacent outlook of the Royal Society, and they played important roles in the formation of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. In the first half of the nineteenth century hardly any aspect of British scientific theory or practice was untouched by the ideas of one or another member of this group.6
Many historians of mathematics have interpreted De Morgan as the opposite of a conceptualist. He is often cast as a major representative of an early nineteenthcentury school of British algebraists-including George
De Morgan can be regarded as a satellite of the Analytical Society. Slightly younger and fiercely independent, he nonetheless corresponded regularly with many of these men and tried to promote the study of mathematics from the somewhat academically provincial outpost of University College. He was an active member of the London scientific scene: his interests spanned astronomy, history, logic, probability, law, and often politics. At heart, however, De Morgan was a mathematician. The diversity of his activities attests to the breadth of his conception of his subject, the wide range of implications attendant on his perception of his role as mathematical researcher and educator.
De Morgan was deeply involved in education. University College was a young and often struggling institution, and De Morgan was totally devoted to his duties there. In addition, he was an active member of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. The Penny Cyclopedia, published by this group, bristles with more than six hundred articles by De Morgan on mathematical and related subjects. Spreading his influence still further, he published several textbooks, as well as less elaborate guides to the study of mathematics.
De Morgan did not confine himself to elementary issues in these works. He felt that the problems that posed the major difficulties for the student learning mathematics were just the problems that lay at the foundations of the subject itself. His attempts to clarify mathematics for beginners parallel his struggles to formulate a view of it for himself. A contemporary map of the British mathematical landscape is clearly laid out in De Morgan's popular tracts. Part of what De Morgan did in his works was to examine and defend his image of mathematical knowledge and its role in intellectual culture. He was deeply concerned with understanding and explaining the essential nature of his subject and its relationship to other forms of knowledge. In this he reveals a temperamental similarity to his Analytical Society friends, who characteristically were fascinated by the philosophy of science. Herschel and Whewell were the major scientific philosophers of their age. Within mathematics, this philosophical focus translated into an interest in foundational questions-particularly in the foundations of what was called "symbolical algebra." The term symbolical algebra described a peculiar approach to algebra that is evident in much of the work of Analytical Society members. The society's original focus was largely on mathematical symbols: they advocated the replacement of Newton's symbology, wherein y' represented the first derivative of an equation (if y = x2, y = 2x), with the Leibnizian symbology, where the same derivative would be expressed as dyldx. Several members of the society campaigned vigorously to change the symbology used at Cambridge, and by 1819, when Peacock became examiner, the symbology on the Tripos was changed.
This effort at changing the symbols was seen as important not because it would allow easier transmission of Continental results to England, but because it promised to strengthen British mathematical research. Algebraic manipulations of the Continental symbology of dyldx and its inverse f y dx had long proved suggestive of new results. Although it was widely acknowledged that such practices as reaching results by "multiplying both sides by dx" could not be rigorously justified, they were remarkably effective. Much of the fertility of eighteenth-century Continental mathematics sprang from the suggestive powers of the Leibnizian symbology. A large part of the Promethean program of the Analytical Society involved making this symbolical power accessible to their compatriots.7
The members of the Analytical Society did not see the power of well-chosen symbologies to be merely pragmatic. In fact, they emphasized that the very foundations of the calculus rested on this symbolic power. In the period when the foundations of calculus were still in dispute, they unambiguously cast their lot with J. L. Lagrange, who had hoped to avoid the foundational difficulties of the calculus by arguing that the derivative was an epiphenomenon of the symbolism of the Taylor De Morgan abandoned his struggle to understand the validity of negative and impossible numbers within the strict numerical confines of generalized arithmetic in the wake of a new interpretation of algebra suggested by one of his Cambridge mentors. In his 1830 text, A Treatise on Algebra, Peacock proposed freeing algebra from the limits of arithmetic. Instead of defining it as a universal arithmetic, Peacock regarded it as its own science, symbolical algebra, which did not rely on arithmetic interpretation for its validity.
In the absence of the interpretative relationship, arithmetic served merely as the "science of suggestion" for Peacock's symbolical algebra. Arithmetic equations like Beyond this suggestive function, Peacock argued, arithmetic had no necessary foundational relation to symbolical algebra. Algebra was a separate study that focused on the symbolical forms themselves and on their interrelationships, looking for interpretations wherever they could be found.
Peacock's approach allowed the relevance of all manner of interpretations to understanding the arithmetically generated but numerically meaningless symbolic forms of algebra. Within the old view of algebra as universal arithmetic, even legitimating negative numbers by drawing analogies to debits and credits was technically inadmissable because it moved from arithmetic into accounting. Peacock's new approach recognized the validity of this kind of reasoning. It opened the door, for example, to sophisticated models like the geometrical one developed in France by Adrien Quentin Buee and introduced into England by John Warren, which embraced not only negative numbers but imaginary ones as well. 12 Peacock's new view was clearly very effective in resolving the conflicts inherent in regarding algebra as universal arithmetic. At the same time, though, it was profoundly disturbing. De Morgan's review of it was five years in the writing because, in his words, of "the very great difficulty of forming fixed opinions upon views so new and so extensive. At first sight it seemed to us something like symbols bewitched, and running about the world in search of meaning. "13 In freeing symbolical algebra from its arithmetic roots, Peacock risked turning the manipulation of algebraic symbols into an empty game with no essential ties to the mathematical ideas that had spawned them.
Peacock attempted is supposed to exist, when the operations which produce it are not definable, its existence is no longer necessary, . . . thus if n be a whole number, the existence of the equivalent series for (1 + X)n is necessary inasmuch as the operation which produces it may be completely defined; but if n be a general symbol, we are unable to define the operation by which we pass from (1 + X)n to its equivalent series, which exists therefore under such circumstances, only in virtue of the permanence of equivalent forms: the connection between one and the other therefore only becomes necessary, when its existence is assumed: in other words, if such an equivalent series does exist, it must be the series in question and no other.15 In this passage Peacock uses the term necessary to refer to cases where the truth of a symbolical equation is attested to by its meaning as well as its form. Even when no such meaning could be assigned, however, the "permanence of equivalent forms" served to guarantee its validity.
Peacock's principle is fundamentally historical in that it defines the validity of a mathematical form by its genesis. However, he did not interpret this principle as temporally contingent; he presented it as the timeless conceptual foundation stone of the science of algebra.
The attempt to fix the principle atemporally, to establish its absolute validity, is explicitly elaborated in the philosophical work of Peacock's friend William Whewell. In his two-volume Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Whewell focused on the problem of how one could find truth by induction from a series of discrete particulars. His solution was one in which scientific truth was not contingent, culled from the recognition of patterns or relations inherent in a set of facts. Rather, truth was attained when the observer applied the appropriate idea, generated from within his mind, to order the facts presented in a particular inquiry. At the basis of each successful scientific subject were a very few subjective fundamental ideas, on which the truth and comprehensibility of the entire science rested. For geometry the fundamental idea was space; for Newtonian dynamics it was force; for symbolical algebra it was Peacock's principle of equivalent forms. The truth of algebra rested on this principle as firmly and timelessly as that of arithmetic rested on number. 16 In his initial response to Peacock's work, his 1835 review, De Morgan apparently embraced Peacock's view of algebraic foundations, complete with the principle. "The work of Mr Peacock is difficult," he noted, "but logical."117 In later writings, however, De Morgan modified his position. He recognized more clearly than Peacock that arithmetic suggestion was not necessary to provide equivalent forms for internally consistent algebraic systems; a set of well-constructed axioms could be relied upon equally well. A typical statement attesting to the possibility of axiomatically generating algebras is found in an 1840 article, "Negative and Impossible Quantities," which De Morgan wrote for the Penny Cyclopedia:
When we wish to give the idea of symbolical algebra, . . . we ask, firstly, what symbols shall be used (without any reference to meaning); next, what shall be the laws under which such symbols are to be operated upon; the deduction of all subsequent consequences is again an application of common logic. Lastly, we explain the meanings which must be attached to the symbols, in order that they may have prototypes of which the assigned laws of operation are true.18
This formulation reverses the order Peacock's principle established in algebra. Rather than moving from meaning to abstract forms, the development is from abstract forms to meaning. More important, though, it does not refer to historical questions about their genesis in judging the validity of algebraic forms. Rather, it grounds their truth on the atemporal internal logic of the axiomatic system.
Not only did De Morgan state, here and elsewhere, that all algebraic consequences could be deduced from a series of basic axioms; he was the first to specify the axioms that would do the trick. In his paper "On the Foundation of Algebra, No. II," he set out the basic axioms of field theory, omitting only associativity, an accomplishment for which he is often remembered in the history of mathematics. De Morgan's actual presentation of the field axioms is rather anticlimactic, however. He prefaced his list with the casual remark: "As far as I can see (and I believe no writer has professed to throw together in one place every thing that is essential to algebraical process) the laws of operation are as follow." Having presented the axioms he did nothing with them, merely commenting, "I believe the preceding rules to be neither insufficient nor redundant, though I should be noways surprised to see them proved both the one and the other; least of all if it were the latter."19 De Morgan's offhand presentation of this material is not false modesty. It accurately reflects his assessment of the intrinsic interest of actually laying down the axioms of a given algebraic system. For De Morgan, such systems are only incidentally logical, They are essentially historical. For the true mathematician they are suggested by mathematical ideas, and, if they are to be significant, they must end in mathematical ideas. In the same paper De Morgan tried to explain his view using the metaphor of a puzzle.
By itself, this method of operation, this algebra of rules without meaning, is no more of a science than the use of the well-known toy called the Chinese puzzle, in which a prescribed number of forms are given, and a large number of different arrangements, of which the outlines only are drawn, are to be produced. Perhaps a dissected map or picture would be a still better illustration: a person who puts one of these together by the backs of the pieces, and therefore is guided only by their forms, and not by their meanings, may be compared to one who makes the transformations of algebra by the defined laws of operation only: while one who looks at the fronts, and converts his general knowledge of the countries painted on them into one of a more particular kind by help of the forms of the pieces, more resembles the investigator and the mathematician.20
The importance of laying out the axiomatic structure of an algebraic system paled in comparison to the final task of interpretation, which gave the system meaning and significance. In these works Peacock had espoused a conceptual view of mathematical development. His unit of historical analysis was mathematical ideas rather than mathematical forms or techniques. Thus in "Arithmetic" Peacock defined arithmetic as "the science of numbers and their notation, and of the different operations to which they are subject." He went on to specify that the "idea of number is one of those which are first presented to the mind, and which indeed may be considered as nearly coexistent with the exercise of our natural faculties," and emphasized the independence of this idea from the number systems, relations, and so forth that were used to describe it.22
The historical development of arithmetic, as Peacock presented it, involved ever-increasing sophistication in understanding the concept of number through the development of new symbology and more sophisticated numerical operations. It was a history of the progressive understanding of fundamental mathematical concepts through the manipulation and development of the symbolical systems that described them.
Peacock's interpretation of mathematical history as the progressive unfolding and clarification of mathematical concepts is similar to the historical interpretation William Whewell developed in his three-volume History of the Inductive Sciences, published in 1837. There Whewell had found all of scientific history to be a saga of the identification and clarification of a few basic scientific concepts. Peacock's histories reflect the same view in the area of the mathematical sciences.
The similarity between Peacock's-and by implication De Morgan's-view of mathematical history and Whewell's view of scientific history is the product of a shared attitude toward history, an attitude that is more explicit in Whewell than in Peacock. This is the conviction that the history of science is itself a science. Accordingly, historians also must be concerned with the identification and clarification of a few basic concepts that can be expected to provide essential material for an understanding of the process of scientific discovery and the nature of science itself. In the introduction to History of the Inductive Sciences Whewell proclaimed:
The examination of the steps by which our ancestory acquired our intellectual estate, may . . . afford us some indication of the most promising mode of directing our future efforts to add to its extent and completeness.
To deduce such lessons from the past history of human knowledge, was the intention which originally gave rise to the present work.23
Whewell maintained this orientation in the two-volume Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences Founded upon Their History published three years later. In the introduction to this work he emphasized:
We can point out a very important peculiarity by which this work is, in its design, distinguished from preceding essays on like subjects; ... it is this: that we purpose to collect our doctrines concerning the nature of knowledge, and the best mode of acquiring it, from a contemplation of the Structure and History of those Sciences (the Material Sciences), which are universally recognized as the clearest and surest exam-ples of knowledge and of discovery. It is by surveying and studying the whole mass of such Sciences, and the various steps of their progress, that we now hope to approach to the true Philosophy of Science.24
Whewell pursued a dual goal in his attempt to develop a philosophy of science based on history. In part he aimed at illuminating the process by which true knowledge was discovered: "By examining the steps by which such acquisitions have been made, we may discover the conditions under which truth is to be obtained." Implicit in this statement is the conviction that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, that the individual searcher after truth would do well to be guided by the processes of history in his attempts to attain true understanding. In addition, Whewell was hoping that history would enable him to understand the defining characteristics of true knowledge: "By considering what is the real import of our acquisitions where they are certain and definite, we may learn something respecting the difference between true knowledge and its precarious or illusory semblances."25 He believed that intellectual genealogy could provide important demarcation criteria for scientific veracity.
De The response was immediate. De Morgan reviewed the work for the 8 January 1859 issue of the Athenaeum and focused directly on the question of whether one could reduce scientific discovery to a logic, a fixed "organon." He firmly emphasized that one could not and carefully excluded the process of discovery from the purview of any fixed method: Dr. Whewell holds that the practical results of the philosophy of science must be rather classification and analysis of what has been done, than precept and method for future doing. Here again we entirely agree. Even in geometry and algebra, . . . the rule is, Imitate those who have succeeded by patiently thinking out, as they did, the method of succeeding. You may be aided by observation of your predecessors: they may give useful hints, but not digested and infallible rules.28
Here, anticipating his 1865 address, De Morgan sees knowledge of historical development as a guide to the individual researcher. Its message is not prescriptive, however; it gives "hints, but not digested and infallible rules."
De Morgan continued to articulate this organic emphasis, widening his point to include not just the private practices of the individual but the entire form of scientific advance. Just as one could not talk of a logic-of discovery or create an organon, he argued, one could not speak of scientific method as "inductive." Induction was too limited a term to describe the development of the sciences as Whewell's history was discovering them to be. "Let induction mean, as it always has done, the generalization by collection of particulars: let the act of the discoverer, by which he divines the general notion under which the particulars can be brought, receive its own proper name. "29 For De Morgan, Whewell's historically based philosophy suggested a radically new model for the sciences that was neither deductive nor inductive. The Cambridge man's major contribution to philosophy was his recognition that scientific formalisms were logically structured descriptions of an underlying conceptual reality that was being slowly revealed through time. Whewell had gleaned this insight from studying the historical development of the sciences. At the same time, it had important implications for the form that development would take in the future. Conceptual progress was not linear in the way logical progress would be. Since formalizations were logical, but the conceptual reality they described was only slowly revealed, science developed in unpredictable ways. The scientific researcher had to be ready to accept confusion and ambiguity on the path to truth.
Whewell's historically based conceptual philosophy was focused primarily on the sciences. writings about various aspects of mathematics he extended Whewell's historically based interpretation of the conceptual nature of science to cover mathematical development. The history to which De Morgan turned his attention for information about the nature of mathematics and its development was that of algebra, specifically the theory of negative and impossible (what are now called imaginary) numbers. The origin and development of these algebraic anomalies was a major interest to which he devoted several scholarly articles.30 As usual with De Morgan's histories, however, these are dry and technical bibliographic discussions. His theoretical interest in thus piling up factual information is revealed more clearly and simply in his more popular writings, particularly those appearing in the Penny Cyclopedia.
In "Negative and Impossible Quantities" De Morgan traced the recognition that such quantities are a problem in the Hindu Viga Ganita (to which he devoted a long article in its proper alphabetical place). In this twelfth-century work "there is mention of a modification of quantity unknown in arithmetic...."
Rules are provided for their use, as in the following example: "Patna is fifteen yojanas east, and Allahabad eight yojanas west, of a place called Varanasi; 'the interval or difference is twenty-three yojanas, and is not obtained but by addition of the numbers. Therefore, if the difference between two contrary quantities be required their sum must be taken.'"" "Surely," De Morgan continued, "it will be said that algebra began in a strange confusion of ideas; but yet the fault is rather in expression than in conception. An art was in existence presenting undoubted means of discovering truth, commencing with a generalization of which the use was obvious, but not the meaning."'31
The There may be many significant algebras in which this is done. But the demand made by common consent is, that our completely significant algebra shall be an extension of the defective system with which we commence: meaning, that so far as that system goes, significantly, it shall be a part of the new system. It would not help us, with reference to the mathematics now established, if fifty completely significant systems were produced, unless in one or more of them the same story were told as in the old algebra, so far as this last tells any story at all. We must have, if possible (and I am to show that it is possible), all that we do understand still understood in the same sense, with such enlargement of meaning as will give significance to symbols which we do not now understand De Morgan's faith in the possibility of his program to find interpretation for algebraic forms was based on an essential faith in mathematical progress. He recognized that there was no internal, necessary reason why one would be able to find interpretations for meaningless algebraic forms. In the passage quoted earlier he qualifies his call for interpretation with the phrase "if possible," and his demonstration of its possibility rested simply on his having done it. He was convinced, however, that by constructively riding historical processes of discovery, mathematicians could be assured that, in time, interpretations would be found that would rigorously ground their results. In the meantime, as he said in "Negative and Impossible Quantities," "we may demand the use of those errors as demonstrated means of finding truth."36 Suspending judgment and relying on empty, symbolically generated forms in algebraic work was a powerful, but temporary, mode of procedure. De Morgan recommended relying on it in the teaching of algebra, where "the beginner [unfamiliar with the underlying ideas] is obliged to content himself with a less rigorous species of proof, though equally conclusive, as far as moral certainty is concerned."37 The same powerful moral certainty was also available to the mathematical thinker who wrote the Viga Ganita and to the young De Morgan, whose faith in the validity of negative numbers had been so fully rewarded. Similarly, De Morgan wrote in 1840, early workers in the calculus of operations were able to proceed using their uninterpretable symbolic methods with a confidence ";amounting to moral certainty, which indeed they were justified in doing. "38 In all of these cases the historical record showed that apparently blind symbolic manipulations would eventually find meaning in new, more general interpretations. De Morgan's focus on the idea of limit as the foundation of the calculus appears to bring his approach to the foundations of calculus in line with the French analytic school of mathematicians led by Cauchy. Cauchy's approach to the calculus, powerfully presented in his Cours d'analyse de l'Ecole Royale Polytechnique in 1821, was also grounded on the limit. However, the importance of the Frenchman's work did not consist of this focus per se. There was a long eighteenth-century tradition of basing the calculus on this idea. Cauchy's originality lay, rather, in his attempt to define the term limit in such a way that the definition itself, as opposed to the concept it described, served as the foundation of the calculus. He tried to clarify the calculus by replacing the vagaries of conceptual meaning with unambiguous mathematical definitions. His work marked the beginning of a concerted effort to create a definitional structure that would fix the meaning of terms like limit, continuity, convergence, and divergence so unambiguously that the whole of legitimate calculus could be erected upon them. The delta-epsilon proof structure for testing limiting processes, which developed from the program Cauchy suggested in the Cours, epitomizes the precision he was trying to introduce in order to ground the calculus rigorously.40
In Differential and Integral Calculus De Morgan also based his calculus on the limit, but he did not adopt Cauchy's philosophical stance. Rather than beginning with a neat definition of the limit that would allow its subsequent use in logical proofs, De Morgan launched into a twenty-nine-page "Introductory Chapter" discussing the idea of the limit, attempting to show how the concept arose from considerations of number and magnitude. Before plunging into this discussion he explicitly laid out his reasons for believing that this elaboration was necessary:
Remembering the acknowledged difficulty of the subject, he [the student of the differential calculus] must be prepared to stop his course until he can form exact notions, acquire precise ideas.... To do this sufficiently ... formal definitions would be useless; for he cannot be supposed to have one single notion in that precise form which would make it worth while to attach it to a word. One reason of the great difficulty which is found in treatises on this subject has always appeared to us to be the tacit assumption that nothing is necessary previously to actually embodying the terms and rules of the science, as if mere statements of definitions could give instantaneous power of using terms rightly. De Morgan's focus on conceptual clarity rather than definitional structure as the essence of mathematical understanding continued beyond this opening chapter. Nowhere in the pages that follow did he develop a precise definitional structure with which to construct the calculus. The following is a typical definition:
DEFINITION:-The function is said to have the value A when x has the value a, either when the common arithmetical sense of these phrases applies, or when by making x sufficiently near to a we can make the function as near as we please to A. In the first case A is simply called. .. an ordinary value of the function: in the second case A is called a singular value.42 Nowhere did he make the idea of "as near as we please to A" more precise.
The Because of the unreliability of divergent series, Poisson concluded that they should be rejected from analysis. This rejection of mathematical forms that had been unexpectedly encountered in the course of algebraic manipulation shocked De Morgan. "I hardly know which of the passages in my Italics ought to excite more surprise," he wrote. "Divergent series, at the time Poisson wrote, had been nearly universally adopted for more than a century, and it was only here and there that a difficulty occurred in using them" (emphasis added).47
Rather than regarding such difficulties as marks of foundational flaws, De Morgan saw them as essential parts of progressive historical process. "We must admit" he wrote, "that many series are such as we cannot at present safely use, except as means of discovery, the results of which are to be subsequently verified." "But," he continued, "to say that what we cannot use no others ever can, to refuse that faith in the future prospects of algebra which has already realised 46 so brilliant a harvest, . . seems to me a departure from all rules of prudence. The motto which I should adopt against a course which seems to me calculated to stop the progress of discovery would be contained in a word and a symbolremember --1. 48 The same argument is elaborated in the "Series" article for the Penny Cyclopedia, where De Morgan again defended the use of algebraically generated divergent series. Here he explicitly developed the parallels between the history of divergent series and that of negative and imaginary numbers:
The divergent series, that is, the equality between it and a finite expression, is perfectly incomprehensible in an arithmetical point of view; so was the impossible quantity. The use of divergent series has been admitted, by one on one explanation, and by another on another, almost ever since the commencement of modern algebra; and so it was with the impossible quantity. It became notorious that such use generally led to true results, with now and then an apparent exception, which most frequently ceased to be such on further consideration; this is well known to have happened with impossible quantities. In both cases these apparent exceptions led some to deny the validity of the method which gave rise to them, while all were obliged to place them both among those parts of mathematics (once more extensive than now) in which the power of producing results had outrun that of interpreting them.
In the case of impossible numbers, De Morgan continued, a complete explanation became available upon the realization that the definitions on which the symbolic system had been erected had been too narrow. "Why," he lamented, "should the divergent series, of all the results of algebra which demand interpretation, be the only one to be thrown away without further inquiry, when in every other case patience and research have brought light out of darkness?"49
In this argument De Morgan was countering a prescriptive, analytical view of mathematical foundations with a historical, conceptual one. The issue, for him, had little to do with the strength or weakness of the specific definitional structure that Cauchy, Poisson, and their followers were trying to develop. Rather than responding on the Frenchman's timeless, logical terms, De Morgan approached their work as a self-consciously historical figure who was willing to accept present ambiguities in the hope of future rewards. He felt that divergent series had been generated in the course of legitimate explorations of algebra. This historical fact forced the conscientious mathematician to try to understand them.
De Morgan did not simply preach patience in the face of problems of interpretation that were generated from legitimate mathematical development. younger generation that, for the most part, had been educated after the excitement over symbolical algebraic development in which he had been so involved. As more and more people became accustomed to trusting algebra's powers in a variety of fields, theoretical interest in its foundations waned. The centrality of interpretation to the truth of an algebraic form continued to be asserted in the educational context. In practice, however, to use De Morgan's terminology, algebra became more of an art than a science.52 The power of its symbology began to be used more as a road to knowledge about other things, like physics, than as more or less disjointed clues to the reality of a single, still elusive, underlying concept. The very variety of its successful applications undermined the assurance that a single one could tie them all together.
However, although by the end of his life De Morgan's work in algebra was idiosyncratic, the historical spirit behind it was not. The progressive orientation De Morgan had introduced into his historical view of mathematics continued to manifest itself strongly in British work, although in geometry more than in algebra. Projective geometry, in particular, fit beautifully into the picture of a progressive mathematical field that De Morgan had painted. In this new approach to geometry, which became a central feature of the British mathematical scene after the 1860s, a new generation of British mathematicians found the same combination of historical continuity and promised progress that had earlier captivated De Morgan in algebra. Like De Morgan's algebra, projective geometry held out tantalizing conceptual challenges in the form of its uninterpreted imaginary points and points at infinity. For many its success was grounded on a "principle of continuity" that played a role analogous to the one Peacock's "principle of equivalent forms" had played in algebra. The historical development of projective ideas was routinely cited as a legitimating factor for poorly defined but effective geometrical practices. The optimism of De Morgan's historically grounded "moral certainty" lived on in the work of his countrymen, who continued to rejoice in their conceptual freedoms, undaunted by the logical strictures that concerned their counterparts on the Continent.53
In important ways, then, De Morgan's immediate legacy to his countrymen was not merely the legacy of strict logic and axiomatics with which current mathematical historians tend to associate his name. Equally important was a historical legacy that allowed a younger generation to agree with him that such things were often only marginally relevant to mathematical progress.
